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Abstract 
When ability complements effort, we would expect effort to increase with variables that proxy for ability. For example, 
we show that the hours worked by entrepreneurs should increase in experience, a proxy for ability. Yet, even if 
education is positively correlated with entrepreneurial ability, it is shown that the relationship between education and 
hours worked is ambiguous. This is because education allows small business owners to work outside the venture 
(moonlight) at higher wages. These predictions are supported by existing empirical work.
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       1
In schools and in the workplace the popular opinion is the idea of ‘specialization.’  That 
is, in order to make more money or get promoted, you need to ‘specialize’…  My 
educated dad believed in the same dogma.  That is why he was thrilled when he 
eventually achieved his doctorate.  He often admitted that schools reward people who 
study more and more about less and less. Rich dad encouraged me to do exactly the 
opposite. ‘You want to know a little about a lot’ was his suggestion.  That is why for 
years I worked in different areas of his companies.  
  Kiyosaki and Lechter (2000, p. 134) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  The quote from the popular non-fiction book above argues that experience— 
not education—will lead budding “rich dads” to entrepreneurial success.  This paper derives 
comparative statics for entrepreneurial hours worked based on observable characteristics.   This 
paper argues that the more hours worked (effort expended) the more likely will the small 
business venture succeed.  Since at least Mirlees (1971) it has been recognized in the economics 
literature that ability is an unobservable characteristic.  We demonstrate that while experience 
may serve as a proxy for a small business woman’s ability, years of education completed may 
lead to puzzling empirical results.  The reason for this is that the experienced but less educated 
have a lower opportunity cost in non-entrepreneurial ventures, relative to the more educated 
labor market participants.  For this reason, education may not be associated with more hours 
worked (or ultimately entrepreneurial success) in small business data sets.  Yet, we should expect 
hours worked to be positively associated with the small business owner’s experience. 
  One of the greatest contributions that small business owners put into their firm is their 
time.  This note considers how entrepreneurs of small ventures divide their time.  It presents a 
simple model that captures some of the empirical regularities that emerge from the data in the 
Survey of Consumer Finances and the Survey of Small Business Finances.  The former survey is 
conducted by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury every three years, and the latter is 
conducted by the Federal Reserve every five years.  Since most of the business owners are small 
entrepreneurs, any statistical analysis of this data is going to be driven by these small business 
owners with firms of very modest sales and annual profits.  Bitler et al. (2005) reports that the 
entrepreneurs in their sample of the firms in the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1989 to 
2001 had a firm with median sales of $90,000 and median sum of entrepreneurial salary and 
profits of $39,000.   The median firm in that sample had three employees, including the 
entrepreneur. 
The primary distinction between this paper and a more standard model on entrepreneurial 
agency such as the one in Bitler et. al (2005) or Wu (2008) is the entrepreneur’s tendency to 
pursue money-making opportunities outside of her venture.  Both these studies present 
theoretical and empirical models of entrepreneurial effort.   They both use hours worked by the 
entrepreneur in her business as a proxy for the owner’s effort.  Because most ventures are so 
small in the data sets of Bitler et al. (2005) and Wu (2008), many of these small business owners 
are likely to supplement their income with outside employment.  Neither Bitler et al. (2005) or 
Wu (2008) addresses how the potential for moonlighting affects the entrepreneur’s hours 
worked.  In contrast, this paper does model how moonlighting affects the business owner’s hours 
worked.  This paper’s predictions are consistent the results in both the aforementioned papers.     2
There is also some similarity between the jack-of-all-trades theory of entrepreneurship 
proposed by Lazear (2004) and Lazear (2005) and the thesis of this paper.  That theory says that 
entrepreneurs are most effective when they acquire skills in many areas instead of specializing in 
one area of education or human capital.  The aforementioned studies by Lazear, Wagner (2003), 
and Wagner (2006) find that entrepreneurs have more eclectic educational backgrounds and 
work histories than other survey participants who have never run their own businesses.  This 
paper too argues that years of education completed will be a poor predictor of entrepreneurial 
success.  Yet, in contrast to the jack-of-all-trades theory, the opportunity cost (or moonlighting) 
theory of the present paper is silent about how entrepreneurial ability is best acquired.  Instead, it 
argues that observed years of experience will be correlated with entrepreneurial success and 
hours devoted to the enterprise.   The jack-of-all trades theory is more concerned with who 
becomes an entrepreneur while this paper focuses on what entrepreneurs do after they have 




2.1 Exogenous Capital Structure 
 
  The standard approach in the agency literature would be to treat capital structure, the 
choice of outside debt and equity, as an endogenous decision made by the entrepreneur.  
Nevertheless, it is very hard to sell outside equity for anything close to the value of the 
discounted cash flows it generates.  Indeed, Bitler et al. (2005) report that about sixty percent of 
the firms in their sample have a 100 percent equity owner.  This seems most consistent with the 
case that entrepreneurs face financial constraints that prevent them from fine-tuning their equity 
stakes.  The other most likely outcome that Bitler et al. (2005) found was that the owner-
manager has one partner with about a 50 percent stake.  This is the case with about 20 percent of 
the firms in their sample.  Therefore, it is likely the that the entrepreneur feels that he or she 
holds too much equity and what little equity she has sold was not the amount she wanted to sell, 
but brought about by an unrepeatable chain of events.  Perhaps the entrepreneur has sold an 
equity stake s to an amicable auntie perhaps, where [0,1). s∈  
In addition, it is hard to borrow unsecured against anything but real assets and salable 
machines.  Yet, depending on the business cycle and the venture manager’s ability to impress a 
stingy banker about her inevitable success, she will likely borrow too little for her liking when 
things are going well.  When things are going poorly, her firm will be drowning in debt, and 
even her family members will refuse to put up equity stakes to pay down those liabilities.  The 
credit constraints when prospects are good and debt overhang when times are bad will mean 
most small business owners will believe their current debt level has been thrust upon them.  It 
certainly is not some rational calculation revisited every year or season.   
Suppose that the entrepreneur has promised D > 0 to her bankers.  Equity investors, 
including the entrepreneur, are residual claimants receiving all the profits after the debt is paid.  
If D is not paid, bond holders receive all the firm’s profits until the debt is paid. 
 
2.2 Time Allocation 
 
We will assume that the entrepreneur has utility that is linearly increasing in 
consumption, U(c) = c.  Let us have U denote utility and c denote consumption.  In this simple   3
model, the business owner consumes all her earnings.  There are two possible profit realizations 
R and r, where R > r.  The probability of the high returns are p(h) =ln(1 ), h α +  and the 
probability of low returns are 1 – p(h) = 1 –ln(1 ). h α +    [0,1] h∈  is the fraction of her working 
hours that the business owner devotes to her small business. The exogenous parameter alpha, α, 
measures the entrepreneur’s ability to generate high returns.  To constrain the probability of high 
returns to be between zero and one, we will define (0, 1], e α ∈ − where e is the exponential 











   
Yet, the chances of success are increasing at a decreasing rate when the entrepreneur increases 














We will abstract away from the whole labor-leisure tradeoff and wealth effects that 
bedevil labor economists.  (It is often ambiguous whether hours worked rises or falls with wealth 
or income.)  We will assume that the entrepreneur’s total working hours are fixed.  Moreover, 
the entrepreneur has linear utility in income.  Given the puzzling low monetary returns to 
entrepreneurship reported in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), assuming risk neutrality 
is not too far off the mark.  That paper argues that the expected returns to entrepreneurship are on 
the order of 10 percent lower than what economic theory says they should accept for taking on 
such undiversified risk. 
The time spent moonlighting is 1 – h.  This outside employment pays a wage w per 
fraction of the time spent moonlighting, where  [0, ). w∈ +∞   Total wages from moonlighting are 
w(1 – h). 
Finally, let us consider the case in which the debt is risky, R > D > r.   In this case, the 
entrepreneur only gets to consume the profits from her venture in the case of high returns.   
 
2.3 Observable Indicators of Ability 
 
  This note is primarily concerned with how observable indicators of entrepreneurial ability 
will affect the hours worked by the entrepreneur.  Two indicators of higher than average ability 
are education and experience.  Let us use “E” to denote years of education and “X” to denote 
years of experience.  Let us assume that ability and outside wages will increase in education.  
Further, let us assume that ability increases in experience.  In summary, we are assuming the 
following about the relationship between ability and moonlighting wages when education and 
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  For all other exogenous parameters we will assume that there will be no effect to 
increasing either education or experience. 
  There is evidence that educational achievement is better correlated with labor market 
success, a high w, than previous work experience.  Addison (1989) for example shows that 
unemployment duration increases in experience but decreases in years of education.  Kletzer 
(1996) finds that the reemployment wages of previously unemployed workers are significantly 
higher in almost all industry sectors when they have more years of schooling.  Yet, a worker’s 
tenure at a previous employer usually has no significant relationship between that worker’s 
wages in his or her new job. 
 
3.  Analysis 
 
The entrepreneur will want to maximize the following utility function, U: 
 
 
... max (1 )[ln(1 )]( ) (1 )
wrt hUs h R Dh w α =− + − +−  (1) 
 
  The first order condition is the following when the small business owner engages in some 



















−− ′ ⇒= −
 (2) 
 
0 h′ >  only if the marginal returns when the entrepreneur works zero hours at her venture 
exceeds the wage rate from moonlighting.  That is  0 h′ >  iff  (1 )( ) . sR D w α − −>   If this were 
not the case, then the entrepreneur would be better off devoting all her time to her outside 
employment and not spending any time managing her venture.  


















The entrepreneur will only work a non-zero number of hours in her venture if and only if her 
returns in the case of success, (1 – s)(R – D), exceed the ratio of the entrepreneur’s opportunity 
cost, w, to entrepreneurial ability, α.  That is, 




′ >− − >  
 
This follows from h′in equation (2). 
When  0 h′ ≤  in (2), then the business will fail with a probability equal to 1. 
  The entrepreneur’s hours worked are declining in the amount shares sold to outside 





















Risky debt, D, and outside equity, s, reduce the entrepreneur’s hours worked in the 
venture.  This point was made by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Wu (2008) finds that both the 
level of debt and percentage of outside equity have a negative and significant sign when the 
entrepreneur’s hours worked is the dependent variable.     
This paper is more interested in the next two comparative statics. More able 
entrepreneurs, with a higher α, who are better able to ensure that the firm reaches the high 
returns, will work more hours in their business.  This former relationship is the ability effect.  
Entrepreneurs who have higher outside option wages, w, will also work more hours 
moonlighting.   This latter relationship is the outside opportunities (moonlighting) effect.  When 
the entrepreneur splits his time between working in the venture and moonlighting, 0 < h′< 1, the 























   
  Let us differentiate hours worked,  , h′  with respect to the entrepreneur’s level of 
education.  Education affects the hours worked through both the ability parameter and the 
outside option wage parameter according to assumptions (i) and (ii).   
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In equation (7), the first term is unambiguously negative and the second term is unambiguously 
positive.  Without knowing the relative magnitude of both terms, the overall sign of equation (7) 
is ambiguous.   
Herein lies the ambiguity between the relationship between the entrepreneur’s education 
attainment and the hours worked in her business.  On one hand, we would expect educational 
attainment to be a proxy for ability.  Therefore, highly educated entrepreneurs would be more 
able and have a high α.   On the other hand, we would expect highly educated entrepreneurs to 
have a high outside option wage.   More educated people would have a higher market wage from 
moonlighting.  Which effect dominates is an empirical question.  Wu (2008) finds that the 
entrepreneur’s hours worked declines with his or her years of education.  This effect is   6
statistically significant, but not strongly significant.  This evidence from Wu (2008) is consistent 
with the outside option (moonlighting) effect dominating.   
  In contrast, the hours worked are unambiguously increasing in the entrepreneur’s 
experience.  To show this, we can differentiate equation (2) with respect to experience, X, and 
















(a) There is an ambiguous theoretical relationship between an entrepreneur’s education 
level and the hours that she devotes to her business. 
(b) The number of hours that the entrepreneur devotes to her venture is increasing in her 
experience. 
 
  This proposition follows from equations (7) and (8). 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
  Small business owners have a choice between devoting time to their venture and working 
for wages as an employee of another firm.  Indeed, if the ratio of wages from external 
employment over entrepreneurial ability gets too high, then the business owner will close down 
her venture.  This paper has presented a simple theoretical model that argues that a small 
business owner’s effort (hours) will increase in the entrepreneur’s experience.  Yet, when the 
entrepreneur can moonlight in other employment, there is no clear theoretical relationship 
between hours worked and the business owner’s level of education. 
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